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Repository for Intrusion Detection 
System
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are an integral 
part of an organization's infrastructure. Without an 
IDS facility in place to monitor network and host ac-
tivities, attempted and successful intrusion attempts 
may go unnoticed. This study proposed a Collabora-
tive Knowledge Repository Architecture for Intrusion 
Detection (CK-RAID). It is based on a distributed 
network of computer nodes, each with their individual 
IDS with a centralized knowledge repository system, 
and firewall acting as a defence. When an unfamiliar 
attack hits any node, the first step the intrusion monitor 
takes is to request from Knowledge Repository Serv-
er the most effective intrusion response. To improve 
performance, Intrusion Update module collaborates 
with IDSs sensor and log by updating their expert rule 
and intrusion information respectively and removing 
the old intrusion signature from the knowledge base 
with the aid of Intrusion Detector Pruning. To ensure 
security of information exchange, RSA encryption 
and Digital Signature were used to encode informa-
tion during transit. The result showed that CK-RAID 
had a detection rate of 97.2%, compared with Medoid 
Clustering, Y-means, FCM and K-means that have an 
accuracy of 96.38%, 87.15%, 82.13% and 77.25% re-
spectively. Therefore, CK-RAID can be deployed for 
efficient detection of all categories of intrusion detec-
tion and response.
ACM CCS (2012) Classification: CCS → Security 
and privacy → Intrusion/anomaly detection and mal-
ware mitigation → Intrusion detection systems
Keywords: intrusion, knowledge repository, network, 
security, digital signature
1. Introduction
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an autho-
rized way of identifying illegitimate users, at-
tacks and vulnerabilities that could affect the 
proper functioning of computer systems, see 
Onashoga et al. [1]. The need for IDS can be 
summed up by a simple principle of network 
security defence in-depth, see Farooqi and 
Khan [2]. 
Typically, heavy reliance is placed on protec-
tion and prevention using controls such as 
routers, firewalls, public key infrastructures, 
virtual private networks, and virus scanners. In 
contrast, critical detection and response func-
tions such as those provided by intrusion de-
tection systems are often overlooked. As such, 
there are no mechanisms to detect and respond 
to intrusion attempts that evade the first lines 
of defence, see Uddin and Rahman [3]. Intru-
sion detection is another type of security tool 
that was designed to protect and secure the in-
formation resources in the system. It comple-
ments firewalls by allowing a higher level of 
analysis of traffic on a network, and monitors 
the behaviour of the sessions on the servers, 
see Sharma and Singh 2016 [4]. Tiwari and 
Gour [5] added that current attacks cannot be 
thwarted by just blocking ports 80 (HTTP) and 
443 (HTTPS). An intrusion detection system 
(IDS) is needed to detect and respond effective-
ly whenever the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of computer resources are under at-
tack, see Sandhu et al. [6].
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The logical structure is based on the action tak-
en by the Knowledge Repository Server (KRS) 
to ascertain the existence of an attack, which in 
turn aids the subsequent decision taken on a re-
occurrence of such an attack at any other node. 
The diagram of the logical structure is shown 
in Figure 1.
Figure 1. CK-RAID Logical Architecture.
The CK-RAID comprises of three major com-
ponents, namely Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS), Knowledge Repository Server (KRS) 
and External Modular Components.
3.1. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
The IDS comprises of IDS log, sensor and re-
sponse module.
3.1.1. The IDS Log
The IDS log enables an administrator to review 
any suspicious network traffic, though logs can-
not be solely depended upon when deploying 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
In the work of Ranjan and Sahoo [12], an anom-
aly intrusion detection which uses K-medoids 
method of clustering (data mining approach) 
for detecting possible intrusion and attacks was 
proposed. KDD Cup99 was used to test the al-
gorithm with the result of 96.38% of accuracy 
and 3.20% of false alert. The weakness of this 
work is the user to root attack, and lack of data 
privacy which was not addressed.
A hybrid architecture for distributed intrusion 
detection system in wireless network was pro-
posed by Rashida [13]. The author built an IDS 
that uses agents as their lowest-level element 
for data collection and analysis and employs 
a structure to allow for scalability using both 
misuse (signature-based) detection and anom-
aly (behaviour-based) detection types of intru-
sion detection. The proposed IDS architecture 
consists of seven modules – Tracker, Anomaly 
Detection Module, Misuse Detection Module, 
Monitor, Signature Generator, Inference De-
tection Module and Countermeasure Module 
combining the results of the three detection 
modules. The proposed architecture has sever-
al shortcomings; detection of intrusions at the 
Inference Module is delayed until all the nec-
essary information gets there from the agents. 
This is a problem common to distributed IDSs.
3. Methodology
The general architecture of Collaborative 
Knowledge Repository Architecture for Intru-
sion Detection (CK-RAID) is based on a dis-
tributed network of computer nodes, each with 
their individual IDS with a centralized knowl-
edge repository system, and firewall as the first 
line of defense against attacks. 
 CK-RAID architecture can be viewed from two 
perspectives: operational structure and logical 
structure. The operational structure is based on 
the physical layout of the CK-RAID. The CK-
RAID is protected by a firewall as its first line 
of defence, which first analyses both incoming 
and outgoing packets for access authorization. 
However, the IDSs basically detect and report 
network intrusions with improved performance 
in collaboration with the Knowledge Reposito-
ry Server (KRS).
A distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS), 
consists of multiple intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) placed over a large network communi-
cating with each other, or with a central server 
that facilitates advanced network monitoring, 
incident analysis, and instant attack data. These 
co-operative systems distributed across a net-
work, enable incident analysts, network opera-
tors and security personnel to get a broader view 
of what is occurring on their network as a whole 
or node. The current state of IDS technology is 
not yet fully reliable, which makes the area of 
IDS an attractive and still open research field. A 
major problem with current IDS is their inabili-
ty to guarantee intrusion detection (low accura-
cy): the current IDS technology is not accurate 
enough to provide reliable detection, see Sharma 
and Singh [4]. The Knowledge-based IDSs are 
considered good but their completeness is not 
based on the fact that they detect all possible at-
tacks but by regular update of knowledge about 
the attacks, see Tiwari et al. [7]. They have been 
identified as possible solution to resolving some 
major anomalies of other variants of IDS if made, 
see Uddin and Rahman [3], Tiwari et al. [7].
In this study, a collaborative knowledge repos-
itory architecture for intrusion detection is pro-
posed with a secure knowledge base and robust 
inference engine with a view to optimise attack 
detection and update rate of known and newly 
emerging attacks so as to update the knowledge 
and the inference rules having classified the 
new alerts as attacks, timely and regularly.
2. Related Work
It is not surprising that a lot of research work has 
been put into developing techniques to mitigate 
intrusion detection. In this section, a review of 
related work on collaborative intrusion detec-
tion systems was conducted. Yang et al. [8] pro-
posed a scheme called Coordinated Attack Re-
sponse and Detection Systems (CARDS), that 
uses a signature-based model for resolving is-
sues. It consists of signature manager, monitor 
and directory services. The system collects data 
in a flexible, distributed manner and the detec-
tion processes are decentralized among various 
monitors and event-driven. CARDS generate 
and distribute detection tasks among monitors 
to cooperatively detect attacks. Detection tasks 
are parts of an attack signature, which the au-
thors refer to as predefined queries.
A collaborative framework for intrusion detec-
tion networks (CIDNs) that uses a Bayesian ap-
proach for feedback aggregation was proposed 
by Fung et al. [9]. The approach was designed 
to solve the problem of traditional intrusion 
detection systems such as host-based intrusion 
detection system and network-based intrusion 
detection system, which can easily be compro-
mised by new or unknown attacks. Collabora-
tion among IDSs enables each IDS to use col-
lective information and experience from other 
IDSs to achieve more accurate intrusion detec-
tions. CIDN employs an overlay network that 
connects IDSs to exchange information with 
each other, which helps in minimizing the com-
bined cost of missed detection and false alarm. 
However, CIDN is a passive IDS with a decen-
tralized architecture. In another related work by 
Fung et al. [10],  bayesian learning was used to 
select and maintain a list of collaborators which 
they can consult about intrusions.
Reputation-based collaborative intrusion detec-
tion network has also been used to lessen the 
impact of malicious alarms. Pérez et al. [11] 
designed a collaborative intrusion detection net-
work (CIDN) that is capable of building and shar-
ing collective knowledge about isolated alarms 
in order to efficiently and accurately detect 
distributed attacks. The authors' model is struc-
tured in a modular way by clustering the closest 
autonomous IDSs in groups. These groups are 
available to share and combine their collective 
knowledge of each other inside the same admin-
istrative domain, while a small group of them are 
available to share high-level information among 
the administrative domains involved in the col-
laborative detection process. In order to avoid 
the spread of false alert within the system, a Wise 
Committee (WC) is saddled with the responsi-
bility of disseminating information with the rest 
of internal members. However, this research did 
not address the issue of data privacy.
Sharma and Singh [4] proposed an approach 
to enhance the collaborative decision making 
by conducting polls between registered intru-
sion detection systems in a network. Intrusion 
activity for new packets and false positives is 
decided based on all opinions gathered from 
registered intrusion detection systems.
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 ● if Dt is an empty set, then t is a leaf node 
labeled by the default class, yd,
 ● if Dt contains records that belong to more 
than one class, use an attribute test to split 
the data into smaller subsets.
It recursively applies the procedure to each sub-
set until all the records in the subset belong to 
the same class.
3.2.3. Security Enhanced Module (SEM)
This consists of Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) and RSA cryptosystem for information 
encryption, decryption and role verification, 
which involves key generation, encryption, de-
cryption, signature and verification.
There are four components of SEM:
1. Node Registration Module which assigns 
an identifier and security parameters to 
every node that joins the intrusion knowl-
edge community.
2. The Node Request Generation Module 
which takes the intrusion parameters and 
the session key of the requesting nodes to 
produce the cipher text, which the server 
uses to compare with the node id for verifi-
cation purpose before authentication.
3. Knowledge Server Response Generation 
Module decrypts the cipher text to get the 
intrusion parameters to check if there are 
similar attack patterns in the database of the 
knowledge server. Once found, it recom-
mends the best suggestion for the intrusion.
4. Node Response Retrieval Module takes 
server's signature parameters, server pub-
lic key, encrypted session key of server 
and private key of the node as input to pro-
duce the server plaintext session key used 
for symmetric key encryption. It then uses 
the cipher text of the server response and 
session key to produce the plaintext re-
sponse which is the actual response to the 
intrusion parameters.
3.3. CK-RAID External Modular 
Components
The external modular components of CK-RAID 
include Intrusion Update Module (IUM) and 
Intrusion Verifier Module (IVM).
(i) The IVM collaborates with the IDS sensor 
in verifying the existence of any suspi-
cious/sniffed intrusions in the knowledge 
repository server. This module hints a par-
ticular node on the intrusion experiences 
of another systems node on the CK-RAID. 
Algorithm 2 describes this process.
Algorithm 2. IVM Algorithm.
subProcedure veriftyTreat(Alert lt, Repository Ln, 
Location loc){
         counter ← 0
         found ← false
         z ← sizeOf (Ln)
         while (counter < z){
         forEach(t in Ln){
                  if (exist(lt.getType(),loc) && ( lt.getType() 
                  == t.getType())){
         IR0 ← getRule(t)
         applyRuleTo(lt, IR0);
         c ← treat (lt, Ln);
         updateLog(lt, Ln, IR0);
         if (c.responseType()=='Intrusion')(
         found ← true;
         }
         }
         ) // endforeach
         counter ← counter + 1;
         } //endwhile}
         return found;
         } // end subProcedure
(ii) The Intrusion Update Module (IUM) col-
laborates with IDS sensor and log by up-
dating their expert rule and intrusion infor-
mation respectively and by removing the 
old intrusion signature from the knowl-
edge base with the aid of the Intrusion De-
tector Pruning (IDP) process. Algorithm 3 
describes this process.
However, The IDP serves two purposes in this 
framework, first to reduce redundancy in the lo-
cal and global knowledge, and also to increase 
because a determined hacker may easily flood 
the network to the extent that the log reaches its 
capacity and fails. Depending upon the operat-
ing system of the IDS, a hacker may also com-
promise the IDS and easily delete information 
in the log. On the other hand, all false positives 
will also be present in the log. If there is a large 
number of false positives, this can be quite an-
noying to the person who has to review the log. 
However, it is important to use the IDS log to 
search for any possible threats. If the IDS de-
tects a match between current network activity 
and an attack in the signatures database, it will 
document the attempted attack in a log.
3.1.2. Sensor
The sensor of the IDS is located in a particular 
host to monitor system-level behaviour and acts 
as a sniffer of network traffic in promiscuous 
mode. The console is the point of central man-
agement for an IDS system. By using the con-
sole, an administrator may take notice of any 
current attack alerts. In many cases, the console 
may be used to customize certain preferences 
for the IDS. IDS sensor will also send an alert 
to the console regarding the attack.
3.1.3. Response Module
This is the component module of the IDS in the 
CK-RAID layout, whose duty is to return ac-
tion from an intrusion event which could either 
be false positive or false negative. It identifies 
intrusion actions sniffed by the sensor on the 
protected system on the network and also gets 
details of old intrusion from the IDS log.
3.2. Knowledge Repository Server (KRS)
The knowledge repository server (KRS) con-
sists of the following components:
3.2.1. Knowledge Base
The knowledge base handles the building and 
sharing of a collective knowledge about isolat-
ed alerts that have been detected individually 
by autonomous IDSs using a schema system. 
This system provides symbolic structure for 
encoding, representing and storing intrusion 
signature data into the knowledge base in struc-
tured form. The main goal of these cooperative 
systems is to extend the capability of individual 
IDSs to detect and respond to alerts beyond its 
individual experience. Also, KB uses a knowl-
edge filtering technology known as the recom-
mender module to mine and recommend intru-
sion responses to intrusion upon request by any 
node when they are faced with any new threat.
3.2.2. Recommender Module
The recommender module takes in intrusion pa-
rameters such as Intruder Port, Intruder IP, Tar-
get Port, and Target services as input, and com-
putes the closest intrusion response based on 
the previous responses. The intrusion response 
set is built by getting all the intrusion responses 
where intrusion parameter(s) matches any of the 
input intrusion parameters, using the Hunt's Al-
gorithm that grows a decision tree (as shown in 
Algorithm 1) in a recursive fashion by partition-
ing the dataset into successively purer subsets, 
using the following if-then procedures.
Algorithm 1. Hunt's Algorithm for Decision Tree  
Classification.
Input: Intrusion Dataset D
Output: Decision tree t
Process:
Induce(D):
if all tuples t in D have label + then
             Return +
if all tuples t in D have label - then
             Return –
for all split criteria C:
D1, C = {t in D | t satisfies C}
D2, C = D - D1
measureQuantity (D1, D2)
Let C be the split
Continue while D ≠ {D1 + D2 + … Dm} where 








Let Dt be the dataset of a node t, the general 
recursive procedure is defined as:
 ● if Dt contains records that belong to the 
same class yt, then t is a leaf node labeled 
as yt,
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input intrusion parameters, using the Hunt's Al-
gorithm that grows a decision tree (as shown in 
Algorithm 1) in a recursive fashion by partition-
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Algorithm 1. Hunt's Algorithm for Decision Tree  
Classification.
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measureQuantity (D1, D2)
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Let Dt be the dataset of a node t, the general 
recursive procedure is defined as:
 ● if Dt contains records that belong to the 
same class yt, then t is a leaf node labeled 
as yt,
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4.1.2. Node Intrusion Monitor Phase
This phase scans the snort log for possible in-
trusion signature and raises alert whenever an 
intrusion hits any host on the node as shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Intrusion monitor interface.
4.1.3. Node Intrusion Detection and Response 
Request Phase
The intrusion monitor scans the IDS log for 
possible intrusion on any host. Each node can 
be attacked with either known attacks or un-
known attacks. A known attack is an attack that 
the local intrusion monitor has the knowledge 
of and can easily respond to with the previous 
successful response. This type of attack may 
not request the attention of an administrator, but 
will log the intrusion and the response for the 
administrator to review later. Figure 3 shows 
the interface of response to known attacks.
When an unfamiliar attack hits any node, the 
first step taken by the intrusion monitor is to 
request from the Knowledge Repository Serv-
er (KRS) the most effective intrusion response 
to the intrusion. This is done with the follow-
ing steps:
1. Encrypt the intrusion parameters with 
Symmetric Encryption AES in this case,
2. Encrypt the Symmetric Key with Asym-
metric Encryption RSA in this case,
3. Send the cypher text for the KRS to de-
crypt and send the intrusion response back 
to the node in signed encrypted format,
4. Verify signature on the response,     
5. Decrypt the response and apply the re-
sponse to the intrusion.
the search and decision-making time when a 
new threat arrives at any node. As adopted by 
Onashoga et al. [14], the Detector for Ageing 
Technology for Adaptive and Collaborative 
SMS Spam Filtering was employed to remove 
aged intrusion signature from the knowledge 
base and also to reduce computation time when 
accessing knowledge at the global scope. Algo-
rithm 4 shows the pseudo-code description of 
the intrusion detection pruning process.
4. Implementation
To show the performance of CK-RAID, a virtu-
al computing device per host was set up on a Li-
nux server with the hardware configuration of 
Intel(R) core i7 @ 2.90 GHz, 4GB RAM, and 
500GB HDD running on Snort IDS, which is an 
open source IDS that relies on packet dumping 
application. WinPcap was used to detect net-
work intrusion.
4.1. CK-RAID Implementation Interface
It consists of five fundamental phases which 
are: Node Registration Phase, Node Intrusion 
Monitor Phase, Node Intrusion Detection and 
Intrusion Response Request Phase, Knowledge 
Server Intrusion Response Computation Phase, 
Node Intrusion Response Retriever and Appli-
cation Phase.
4.1.1. Node Registration Phase
This phase requires every new node that joins 
the intrusion knowledge community to register 
the node to the community. This phase is re-
quired to assign an identifier to the node and 
also to generate a security parameter for the 
node administrator. 
Algorithm 3. IUM Algorithm.
subProcedure 







DR[] = getInferenceRule (Dm);
DRk + 1 ← DR[] + Rec(lt, Params);
c ← treat(lt, DRk + 1);
if (c, responseType() == 'Intrusion'){
tn + 1 = lt ;
foreach(t in Dm){






         }
else {
createNewSigClass (gn + 1);
assignToClass(tn + 1, gn + 1)
}
IRk + 1 = add(tn, IRk + 1)
//update IDS inference Rule
TLn = add(tn, n + 1)
//update IDS log
DRk + 1 = add(tn, DRk + 1)
// update knowledge inference Rule
Dm = add(tn, m + 1)
// update knowledge base dataset
feedback = true;
                  }
return feedback;
}
Algorithm 4. Intrusion detection pruning algorithm
Intrusion Ageing threshold t, current system daytime c, 
knowledge base intrusion set T, intrusion age to , index i.
         i ← 0;
         while (i < sizeOf (T))
         (         to = Difference (c, 
         LastEntryDateTime (T [i]))
                   if (to ≥ t) {
                           Delete(T [i]);  
                   )
  
                   else{
         LastEntryDatetime(T [i]) = currentSystime();
                           Retain(T [i]);
                   } endif
         } endwhile
Figure 4. Response to unknown attack from KRS using 
the Knowledge Recommender Module.
Figure 3. Response to known attacks.
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From Table 1, the Average Response Time 
(ART) for each intrusion category set was esti-

















4.2.1. Comparison of CK-RAID with Related 
Work
CK-RAID was compared with the existing re-
lated framework of intrusion detection system, 
in order to measure its effectiveness. Specifical-
ly, 5% of KDD Cup 99 dataset which contains 
about 2,454,431 intrusion set of about 20 differ-
ent intrusion types were used as an input to con-
duct further experiment. 600,000 data points 
out of the intrusion set were considered as the 
input, 70% for training and 30% for testing. The 
results yielded 97.2% accuracy and false posi-
tive rate of 3.12%. The result of the experiment 
is represented in Table 2.
Table 2. KDD Cup 99 intrusion set metrics.
Metrics Values Performance Metric %
TP 474300 FPR 3.12
TN 108900 FNR 2.73
FP 3507 TPR 97.27
FN 13293 TNR 96.88
Accuracy 97.20
CK-RAID result shows 0.8% increase in de-
tection accuracy when compared with Ranjan 
and Sahoo (2014) who presented clustering ap-
proach for anomaly intrusion detection with the 
accuracy of 96.38% and false positive rate of 
3.2%. Figure 5 is a graphical description of the 
accuracy (%) and false alarm comparison be-
tween CK-RAID, medoid clustering, and three 
other algorithms.






























This research work presents a collaborative 
knowledge filtering driven by decision tree al-
gorithm to classify intrusions so as to improve 
the accuracy of intrusion detection and intrusion 
response. RSA encryption and digital signature 
were used to secure the information exchange 
among the nodes in the distributed network 
environment. The pfSense firewall was used 
to simulate the distributed network environ-
ment. The result obtained shows an increase 
in the timeliness of the intrusion detection and 
response, as well as the accuracy in intrusion 
detection and response.
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On the other hand, where an unfamiliar attack 
does not have any replica in KRS, the KRS 
will suggest possible intrusion response that 
can neutralize that type of attack by using the 
knowledge recommender module, as shown in 
Figure 4.
4.1.4. Knowledge Repository Server Intrusion 
Response Phase
In the Knowledge Repository Server, whenever 
an intrusion request comes in, the Knowledge 
Base (KB) performs the following steps:
1. Decrypt the cypher text to get the intrusion 
parameter 
2. Check if there is a similar attack parameter 
in the database 
3. If there are similar parameters, it will pass 
them all to the knowledge recommender 
module to recommend the best suggestion 
among the responses. 
4. Else if the parameters combinations are 
new, it also passes them to the knowledge 
recommender module to recommend the 
possible effective responses.
4.1.5. Node Intrusion Response Retriever and 
Application Phase
At this phase, the node retrieves the signed en-
crypted response and verifies signature on the 
response before decrypting the response and 
applying the response to the intrusion.
4.2. Performance Evaluation
The performance of CK-RAID was measured 
based on known and benchmarked metrics of 
Collaborative IDS which are timeliness, accu-
racy and robustness. Timeliness in collaborative 
intrusion detection system is the time taken for 
a node to get the analysis results of the intrusion 
parameters after initiating the request. Accura-
cy in intrusion detection is an essential property 
of the security system which is the question of 
information privacy and information filtering. 
These two features are combined to give accu-
rate intrusion response to request by any node, 
while robustness is the question of how resilient 
is the collaborative system to attack, especially 
the insider attack.
The experiment consists of three nodes with a 
minimum of three hosts each. IDSs were placed 
on each node to detect and respond to intrusion 
alert. The experiment was performed using put-
ty to telnet connections to systems with twenty 
different types of simulated attacks.
Some of the alerts were known by some IDS 
in the environment and recorded as known at-
tack by the different IDS in the simulated envi-
ronment. Ten (10) out of the simulated attacks 
were picked at random and launched to the 
three nodes at random. The time taken for the 
knowledge server to generate a response in sec-
onds was recorded for the ten experiment runs, 
which is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Intrusion response time.
Number of 




1. Locally known attack 0.313
2. Globally known attack 1.011
3. Locally known attack 0.314
4. Locally known attack 0.312
5. Globally known attack 1.133
6. Globally known attack 1.311
7. Globally known attack 1.331
8. Unknown attack 1.578
9. Locally known attack 0.314
10. Locally known attack 0.314
Suppose the intrusion category sets: Global In-
trusion G, Local intrusion L and unknown in-
trusion U are defined as:
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